Robust Strategies and Counter-Strategies: From Superhuman to Optimal Play

> Mike Johanson January 14, 2016 Grad Seminar



michael.johanson@gmail.com













Chinook (Checkers):

- Surpassed humans in 1994
- Solved (perfect play) in 2007







Chinook (Checkers):

- Surpassed humans in 1994
- Solved (perfect play) in 2007

Deep Blue (Chess): - Surpassed humans in 1997





Chinook (Checkers):

- Surpassed humans in 1994
- Solved (perfect play) in 2007

Deep Blue (Chess): - Surpassed humans in 1997



Watson (Jeopardy!): - Surpassed humans in 2011





Chinook (Checkers):

- Surpassed humans in 1994
- Solved (perfect play) in 2007

Deep Blue (Chess): - Surpassed humans in 1997



Watson (Jeopardy!): - Surpassed humans in 2011

Current challenges (not yet superhuman): go, Atari 2600 games, General Game Playing, Starcraft, RoboCup, poker, curling (?!) and so on...









Babbage and Lovelace: Wanted "Games of Purely Intellectual Skill" to demonstrate their Analytical Engine. **Chess**, Tic-Tac-Toe. Horse racing?







Babbage and Lovelace: Wanted "Games of Purely Intellectual Skill" to demonstrate their Analytical Engine. Chess, Tic-Tac-Toe. Horse racing?



Alan Turing:

Wrote a chess program before first computers, and ran it by hand. Chess as part of the Turing Test.





Babbage and Lovelace: Wanted "Games of Purely Intellectual Skill" to demonstrate their Analytical Engine. **Chess**, Tic-Tac-Toe. Horse racing?



Alan Turing:

Wrote a chess program before first computers, and ran it by hand. **Chess** as part of the Turing Test.



John von Neumann: Founded **Game Theory** to study rational decision making. Needed computational power to drive it, became pioneer in Computing Science.

We aspire to create agents that can achieve their goals in complex real-world domains.

We aspire to create agents that can achieve their goals in complex real-world domains.

Games provide a series of well-defined and tractable domains that humans find challenging.

We aspire to create agents that can achieve their goals in complex real-world domains.

Games provide a series of well-defined and tractable domains that humans find challenging.

New games introduce new challenges that current approaches can't handle. This is a gradient we can follow.

We aspire to create agents that can achieve their goals in complex real-world domains.

Games provide a series of well-defined and tractable domains that humans find challenging.

New games introduce new challenges that current approaches can't handle. This is a gradient we can follow.

Can play against humans, to compare Artificial Intelligence to Human Intelligence.

John von Neumann pioneered Game Theory. When asked about real life and **chess**, he said...



John von Neumann pioneered Game Theory. When asked about real life and **chess**, he said...



Real life is not like that.

Real life consists of bluffing, of little tactics of deception, of asking yourself what is the other man going to think I mean to do.

And that is what games are about in my theory.

2-player,

deterministic,

perfect information game,

with win / lose / tie outcomes.

Poker:

2-player,

2-10 Players (at one table) Thousands (tournaments)

deterministic,

perfect information game,

with win / lose / tie outcomes.

2-player,

deterministic,

perfect information game,

with win / lose / tie outcomes.

Poker:

2-10 Players (at one table) Thousands (tournaments)

Stochastic: Cards randomly dealt to players and the table.

2-player,

deterministic,

perfect information game,

with win / lose / tie outcomes.

Poker:

2-10 Players (at one table) Thousands (tournaments)

Stochastic: Cards randomly dealt to players and the table.

Imperfect Information: Opponent's cards are hidden.

2-player,

deterministic,

perfect information game,

with win / lose / tie outcomes.

Poker:

2-10 Players (at one table) Thousands (tournaments)

Stochastic: Cards randomly dealt to players and the table.

Imperfect Information: Opponent's cards are hidden.

Maximize winnings by exploiting opponent errors.

Topic: Computing strong strategies in Imperfect Information Games

2015:

PhD End

2008: PhD Start

Two key milestones in 2-Player limit hold'em poker:

2015:

PhD End

2008: PhD Start

Two key milestones in 2-Player limit hold'em poker:



Two key milestones in 2-Player limit hold'em poker:



Two key milestones in 2-Player limit hold'em poker:



Two key milestones in 2-Player limit hold'em poker:



Note: I'll be **very** high-level in this talk. This is a summary of 7 papers in my thesis, and 7 more not in my thesis. Ask questions! Superhuman Play:

The Abstraction-Solving-Translation Procedure.

This is how we beat the pros in 2008.

First used in poker by Shi and Littman in 2002.

Still the dominant approach in large games.

Terminology:

Strategy: A policy for playing a game. At every decision, a probability distribution over actions. Terminology:

Strategy: A policy for playing a game. At every decision, a probability distribution over actions.

Best Response: A strategy that maximizes utility against a specific target strategy.

Terminology:

Strategy: A policy for playing a game. At every decision, a probability distribution over actions.

Best Response: A strategy that maximizes utility against a specific target strategy.

Nash Equilibrium: A strategy for every player that are all mutually best responses to the others.

In a 2-player zero-sum game, it's guaranteed to do no worse than tie.



Solve the game by computing a Nash Equilibrium.

(Opponent Modelling comes later)





The AI Step: Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR)

Start with Uniform Random strategy.

Repeatedly plays against itself.





Update: At each decision, use the historically best actions more often. (minimizing regret)



Average strategy converges towards a Nash equilibrium.


The AI Step: Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR)



Memory Cost: **2 doubles** per **Action-at-Decision-Point** (16 bytes)

















Intuition:

Using abstraction limits the strategy's strength.

Merging decisions together loses information.

Intuition:

Using abstraction limits the strategy's strength.

Merging decisions together loses information.

Bigger (finer-grained) and Better (feature-preserving) abstractions

Better Strategies: wins more, less exploitable

Intuition:

Using abstraction limits the strategy's strength.

Merging decisions together loses information.

Bigger (finer-grained) and Better (feature-preserving) abstractions

Better Strategies: wins more, less exploitable

Better Computers, Better Algorithms



Abstraction-Solving-Translation was enough to beat top human pros.

In retrospect, it was easy: ~8 GB RAM, a few CPU-days. Fairly small abstractions, too!

2007: Narrow loss. 4 GB strategy. 2008: Narrow win. 8 GB strategy.

In 2011, we discovered that these strategies were VERY exploitable.

The Man-vs-Machine strategies were beatable, but small.

At the time, we thought: to be optimal, maybe we just have to solve a big enough abstraction!

If we can reduce exploitability to "1 milli-big-blind", then it's *essentially* solved.

Close enough - justification later in this talk.

Solving Attempt #1 (2008-2011):

The Man-vs-Machine strategies were beatable, but small.

At the time, we thought: to be optimal, maybe we just have to solve a big enough abstraction!

If we can reduce exploitability to "1 milli-big-blind", then it's *essentially* solved.

Close enough - justification later in this talk.

In 2011, we wrote a fast algorithm for finding perfect real-game counter-strategies. (IJCAI 2011)

For the first time, we could measure exploitability!

We turned a 10 CPU-year computation into a 76 CPU-day computation. 1 day on the cluster.

Looking back at 5 years of progress!



We'll just solve a big enough abstraction!



This was worrying... Flattening out already?

...But here's the overfitting effect:



...But here's the overfitting effect:



So: we're far from solved, and have a serious problem!

But we're stuck with abstraction.

Can a different algorithm avoid overfitting?

Solving Attempt #2 (2012):

We'll solve a really big abstraction, but *properly*, so we don't overfit. We're solving a 2-player game.

If both players use abstraction, we overfit.

We're solving a 2-player game.

If both players use abstraction, we overfit.

What if one player uses abstraction, and their opponent doesn't?

By definition, abstracted player minimizes exploitability!

CFR-BR (AAAI 2012)

Normally, even one unobstructed player would cost 262 TB of memory.

But we *can* do it without that much... The 76-day best response computation does that!

Maybe if we run that in a loop...

CFR-BR (AAAI 2012)

Normally, even one unobstructed player would cost 262 TB of memory.

But we *can* do it without that much... The 76-day best response computation does that!

Maybe if we run that in a loop... and use sampling tricks to avoid the time cost... it's feasible!

Promising results! CFR-BR has no overfitting, and is far less exploitable! Small abstraction, but beat all previous strategies!



In a big strategy (225 GB to solve), we got closer to optimal than ever before.



However, CFR-BR *lost* in actual games. Assuming opponent is stronger —> too pessimistic!



And still wasn't getting low enough:



That last strategy was computed on "Hungabee", an SGI UV 1000 in GSB. 16TB, 2048 cores.



North Saskatchewan River, -10C day



That last strategy was computed on "Hungabee", an SGI UV 1000 in GSB. 16TB, 2048 cores.



North Saskatchewan River, -10C day



Water cooling, heat dumped to river.

That last strategy was computed on "Hungabee", an SGI UV 1000 in GSB. 16TB, 2048 cores.



North Saskatchewan River, -10C day



Water cooling, heat dumped to river.

Program Output

Solving Attempt #3 (2013):

CFR-D: We'll avoid the memory cost by solving game fragments as needed.

Watch for this in Neil Burch's upcoming thesis!

Flaw: ~16 GB instead of 523 TB of storage... ...but **massive** increase in CPU time required. Finally:

Heads-Up Limit Texas Hold'em is Solved. Science, 2015.


In October 2013, our coauthor Oskari Tammelin contacted us with two ideas:



Poker-specific data compression. 523 TB \longrightarrow 17 TB

In October 2013, our coauthor Oskari Tammelin contacted us with two ideas:





CFR+. A new (at that time theoretically unproven) variant that converges **amazingly** quickly. Key change: floor regret values at zero.

Third piece: Massive resources from Compute Canada.

From our earlier attempts, we had experience with large distributed programs.

Third piece: Massive resources from Compute Canada.

"Mammouth" cluster in Quebec. We used 200 nodes, 24 cores/node. 4800 cores.

Each node had 32 GB RAM, and 1 TB of local disk.

Each node handled a set of subgames. Solve with massive parallelism.



Our algorithms converge towards optimal play in the limit.

"Solved" means unbeatable. We can only approximate it. So how close is "close enough"?

What if a human lifetime of play wasn't enough for someone to claim to beat our program?

What if a human lifetime of play wasn't enough for someone to claim to beat our program?

(200 games/hour) * (12 hours/day) * (70 years)= 60 million games.

What if a human lifetime of play wasn't enough for someone to claim to beat our program?

(200 games/hour) * (12 hours/day) * (70 years)= 60 million games.

That isn't enough to discern "1 milli-big-blind" of exploitability with 95% confidence. So that's our goal.

After 70 days (900 CPU-years), we reached 0.986 mbb/g. Essentially solved.

Holdem: CFR+ Exploitability over Days



After 70 days (900 CPU-years), we reached 0.986 mbb/g. Essentially solved.

Holdem: CFR+ Exploitability over Days



____1

70



Play against it, inspect strategy, download the code: <u>http://poker.srv.ualberta.ca</u>

Conclusion:



- My research spanned the End-to-End task of Abstraction-Solving-Translation
- Much easier to surpass humans than to be perfect!
- General set of tools: applicable to other games, and outside the games domain entirely.